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Abstract
We consider the standard model of finite two-person
zero-sum stochastic games with signals. We are interested
in the existence of almost-surely winning or positively win-
ning strategies, under reachability, safety, Büchi or co-
Büchi winning objectives. We prove twoqualitative deter-
minacyresults. First, in a reachability game either player
1 can achieve almost-surely the reachability objective, or
player 2 can ensure surely the complementary safety ob-
jective, or both players have positively winning strategies.
Second, in a B̈uchi game if player1 cannot achieve almost-
surely the B̈uchi objective, then player2 can ensure pos-
itively the complementary co-Büchi objective. We prove
that players only need strategies withfinite-memory, whose
sizes range from no memory at all to doubly-exponential
number of states, with matching lower bounds. Together
with the qualitative determinacy results, we also provide fix-
point algorithms for deciding which player has an almost-
surely winning or a positively winning strategy and for com-
puting the finite memory strategy. Complexity ranges from
EXPTIME to 2EXPTIME with matching lower bounds,
and better complexity can be achieved for some special
cases where one of the players is better informed than her
opponent.
Introduction
Numerous advances in algorithmics of stochastic games
have recently been made [9, 8, 6, 4, 11, 13], motivated in
part by application in controller synthesis and verification of
open systems. Open systems can be viewed as two-players
games between the system and its environment. At each
round of the game, both players independently and simul-
taneously choose actions and the two choices together with
the current state of the game determine transition probabil-
ities to the next state of the game. Properties of open sys-
tems are modeled as objectives of the games [8, 12], and
∗This work is supported by ANR-06-SETI DOTS.
strategies in these games represent either controllers of the
system or behaviors of the environment.
Most algorithms for stochastic games suffer from the
same restriction: they are designed for games where play-
ers can fully observe the state of the system (e.g. concur-
rent games [9, 8] and stochastic games with perfect infor-
mation [7, 13]). The full observation hypothesis can hinder
interesting applications in controller synthesis becausef ll
monitoring of the system is hardly implementable in prac-
tice. Although this restriction is partly relaxed in [16, 5]
where one of the players has partial observation and her op-
ponent is fully informed, certain real-life distributed sys-
tems cannot be modeled without restricting observations of
bothplayers.
In the present paper, we considerstochastic games with
signals, that are a standard tool in game theory to model
partial observation [23, 20, 17]. When playing a stochastic
game with signals, players cannot observe the actual state of
the game, nor the actions played by their opponent, but are
only informed via private signals they receive throughout
the play. Stochastic games with signals subsume standard
stochastic games [22], repeated games with incomplete in-
formation [1], games with imperfect monitoring [20], con-
current games [8] and deterministic games with imperfect
information on one side [16, 5]. Players make their deci-
sions based upon the sequence of signals they receive: a
strategy is hence a mapping from finite sequences of private
signals to probability distributions over actions.
From the algorithmic point of view, stochastic games
with signals are considerably harder to deal with than
stochastic games with full observation. Whilevaluesof the
latter games are computable [8, 4], simple questions like
‘is there a strategy for player1 which guarantees winning
with probability more than1
2
?’ areundecidableeven for re-
stricted classes of stochastic games with signals [15]. For
this reason, rather thanquantitativeproperties (i.e. ques-
tions about values), we focus in the present paper onquali-
tativeproperties of stochastic games with signals.
We study the following qualitative questions about
stochastic games with signals, equipped with reachability,
1
safety, Büchi or co-Büchi objectives:
(i) Does player1 have analmost-surely winning strategy,
i.e. a strategy which guarantees the objective to be
achieved with probability1, whatever the strategy of
player2?
(ii) Does player2 have apositively winning strategy, i.e.
a strategy which guarantees the opposite objective to
be achieved with strictly positive probability, whatever
the strategy of player1?
Obviously, given an objective, properties (i) and (ii) cannot
hold simultaneously. For games with a reachability, safety
or Büchi objective, we obtain the following results:
(1) Either property (i) holds or property (ii) holds; in other
words these games arequalitatively determined.
(2) Players only need strategies withfinite-memory, whose
memory sizes range from no memory at all to doubly-
exponential number of states.
(3) Questions (i) and (ii) are decidable. We provide fix-
point algorithms for computing uniformly all initial
states that satisfy (i) or (ii), together with the corre-
sponding finite-memory strategies. The complexity of
the algorithms ranges fromEXPTIME to 2EXPTIME.
These three results are detailed in Theorems 1, 2, 3 and 4.
We prove that these results are tight and robust in several
aspects. Games with co-Büchi objectives are absent from
these results, since they are neither qualitatively determined
(see Fig. 3) nor decidable (as proven in [2]).
Our main result, and the element of surprise, is that
for winning positively a safety or co-Büchi objective, a
player needsa memory with a doubly-exponential num-
ber of states, and the corresponding decision problem is
2EXPTIME-complete. This result departs from what was
previously known [16, 5], where both the number of mem-
ory states and the complexity are simply exponential. These
results also reveal a nice property ofreachability games,
that Büchi games do not enjoy: Every initial state is ei-
theralmost-surely winningfor player1, surely winningfor
player2 or positively winningfor both.
Our results strengthen and generalize in several ways re-
sults that were previously known for concurrent games [9,
8] and deterministic games with imperfect information
on one side [16, 5]. First, the framework of stochastic
games with signals strictly emcompasses all the settings
of [16, 9, 8, 5]. In concurrent games there is no signal-
ing structure at all, and in deterministic games with imper-
fect information on one side [5] transitions are determinist c
and player2 observes everything that happens in the game,
including results of random choices of her opponent.
No determinacy result was known for deterministic
games with imperfect information on one side. In [16, 5],
algorithms are given for deciding whether the imperfectly
informed player has an almost-surely winning strategy for
a Büchi (or reachability) objective but nothing can be in-
ferred in case she has no such strategy. This open question
is solved in the present paper, in the broader framework of
stochastic games with signals.
Our qualitative determinacy result (1) is a radical gener-
alization of the same result for concurrent games [8, Th.2],
while proofs are very different. Interestingly, for concur-
rent games, qualitative determinacy holds for every omega-
regular objectives [8], while for games with signals we
show that it fails already for co-Büchi objectives. Inter-
estingly also, stochastic games with signals and a reacha-
bility objective have a value [19] but this value is not com-
putable [15], whereas it is computable for concurrent games
with omega-regular objectives [10]. The use of randomized
strategies is mandatory for achieving determinacy results,
this also holds for stochastic games without signals [22, 9]
and even matrix games [24], which contrasts with [3, 16]
where only deterministic strategies are considered.
Our results about randomized finite-memory strategies
(2), stated in Theorem 2, are either brand new or generalize
previous work. It was shown in [5] that for deterministic
games where player2 is perfectly informed, strategies with
a finite memory of exponential size are sufficient for player
1 to achieve a Büchi objective almost-surely. We prove the
same result holds for the whole class of stochastic games
with signals. Moreover we prove that for player2 a doubly-
exponential number of memory states is necessary and suf-
ficient for achieving positively the complementary co-Büchi
objective.
Concerning algorithmic results (3) (see details in Theo-
rem 3 and 4) we show that our algorithms are optimal in
the following meaning. First, we give a fix-point based al-
gorithm for deciding whether a player has an almost-surely
winning strategy for a Büchi objective. In general, this algo-
rithm is 2EXPTIME. We show in Theorem 5 that this prob-
lem is indeed 2EXPTIME-hard. However, in the restricted
setting of [5], it is already known that this problem is only
EXPTIME-complete. We show that our algorithm is also
optimal with anEXPTIME complexity not only in the set-
ting of [5] where player2 has perfect information but also
under weaker hypothesis: it is sufficient that player2 has
more informationthan player1. Our algorithm is alsoEX-
PTIME when player1 has full information (Proposition 2).
In both subcases, player2 needs only exponential memory.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we intro-
duce partial observation games, in Section 2 we define the
notion of qualitative determinacy and we state our determi-
nacy result, in Section 3 we discuss the memory needed by
strategies. Section 4 is devoted to decidability questionsand
Section 5 investigates the precise complexity of the general
problem as well as special cases.
2
1 Stochastic games with signals.
We consider the standard model of finite two-person
zero-sum stochastic games with signals [23, 20, 17]. These
are stochastic games where players cannot observe the ac-
tual state of the game, nor the actions played by their op-
ponent, their only source of information are private sig-
nals they receive throughout the play. Stochastic games
with signals subsume standard stochastic games [22], re-
peated games with incomplete information [1], games with
imperfect monitoring [20] and games with imperfect infor-
mation [5].
Notations. Given a finite setK, we denote byD(K) =
{δ : K → [0, 1] |
∑
k δ(k) = 1} the set of probability
distributions onK and for a distributionδ ∈ D(K), we
denotesupp(δ) = {k ∈ K | δ(k) > 0} its support.
States, actions and signals. Two players called1 and2
have opposite goals and play for an infinite sequence of
steps, choosing actions and receiving signals. Players ob-
serve their own actions and signals but they cannot observe
the actual state of the game, nor the actions played and the
signals received by their opponent. We borrow notations
from [17]. Initially, the game is in a state chosen according
to an initial distributionδ ∈ D(K) known by both players;
the initial state isk0 with probability δ(k0). At each step
n ∈ N, players1 and2 choose some actionsin ∈ I and
jn ∈ J . They respectively receive signalscn ∈ C anddn ∈
D, and the game moves to a new statekn+1. This happens
with probabilityp(kn+1, cn, dn | kn, in, jn) given by fixed
transition probabilitiesp : K × I × J → D(K × C × D),
known by both players.
Plays and strategies. Players observe their own actions
and the signals they receive. It is convenient to assume
that the actioni player1 plays is encoded in the signalc
she receives, with the notationi = i(c) (and symmetri-
cally for player2). This way, plays can be described by
sequences of states and signals for both players, without
mentioning which actions were played. A finite play is a
sequencep = (k0, c1, d1, . . . , cn, dn, kn) ∈ (KCD)∗K
such that for every0 ≤ m < n, p(km+1, cm+1, dm+1 |
km, i(cm+1), j(dm+1)) > 0. An infinite play is a sequence
p ∈ (KCD)ω whose prefixes are finite plays.
A (behavioral) strategy of player1 is a mappingσ :
D(K) × C∗ → D(I). If the initial distribution isδ and
player1 has seen signalsc1, . . . , cn then she plays action
i with probabilityσ(δ, c1, . . . , cn). Strategies for player2
are defined symmetrically. In the usual way, an initial dis-
tribution δ and two strategiesσ andτ define a probability
measurePσ,τδ on the set of infinite plays, equipped with the
σ-algebra generated by cylinders.
We use random variablesKn, In, Jn, Cn andDn to de-
note respectively then-th state, action of player1, action of
player2, signal of player1 and signal of player2.
Winning conditions. The goal of player1 is described
by a measurable eventWin called thewinning condition.
Motivated by applications in logic and controller synthe-
sis [12], we are especially interested inreachability, safety,
Büchi and co-B̈uchi conditions. These four winning condi-
tions use a subsetT ⊆ K of target statesin their definition.
The reachability condition stipulates thatT should be vis-
ited at least once,Win = {∃n ∈ N, Kn ∈ T }, the safety
condition is complementaryWin = {∀n ∈ N, Kn 6∈ T }.
For the Büchi condition the est of target states has to be vis-
ited infinitely often,Win = {∃A ⊆ N, |A| = ∞, ∀n ∈
A, Kn ∈ T }, and the co-Büchi condition is complementary
Win = {∃m ∈ N, ∀n ≥ m, Kn 6∈ T }.
Almost-surely and positively winning strategies. When
player1 and2 use strategiesσ andτ and the initial distri-
bution isδ, then player1 wins the game with probability:
P
σ,τ
δ (Win) .
Player1 wants to maximize this probability, while player2
wants to minimize it. The best situation for player1 is when
she has an almost-surely winning strategy.
Definition 1 (Almost-surely winning strategy). A strategy
σ for player1 is almost-surely winningfrom an initial dis-
tribution δ if
∀τ, Pσ,τδ (Win) = 1 . (1)
When such a strategyσ exists, bothδ and its support
supp(δ) are said to be almost-surely winning as well.
A less enjoyable situation for player1 is when she only
has a positively winning strategy.
Definition 2 (Positively winning strategy). A strategyσ for
player1 is positively winningfrom an initial distributionδ
if
∀τ, Pσ,τδ (Win) > 0 . (2)
When such a strategyσ exists, bothδ and its support
supp(δ) are said to be positively winning as well.
The worst situation for player1 is when her opponent
has an almost-surely winning strategyτ , which ensures
P
σ,τ
δ (Win) = 0 for all strategiesσ chosen by player
1. Symmetrically, a strategyτ for player 2 is positively
winning if it guarantees∀σ, Pσ,τδ (Win) < 1. These no-
tions only depend on the support ofδ sincePσ,τδ (Win) =
∑
k∈K δ(k) · P
σ,τ
1k
(Win).
Consider the one-player game depicted on Fig. 1. The
objective of player1 is to reach statet. The initial distribu-
tion is δ(1) = δ(2) = 1
2
andδ(t) = δ(s) = 0. Player1
3
1
ac
1
2
α⊥
1
2
⊥⊥
2
ac
1
2
⊥⊥
1
2
β⊥
s
t
∗∗
∗∗
g1c
g2c
g2c
g1c
Figure 1. When the initial state is chosen at
random between states 1 and 2, player 1 has
a strategy to reach t almost surely.
plays with actionsI = {a, g1, g2}, whereg1 andg2 mean
respectively ‘guess1’ and ‘guess2’, while player2 plays
with actionsJ = {c} (that is, player 2 has no choice).
Player1 receives signalsC = {α, β,⊥} and player2 is
‘blind’, she always receives the same signalD = {⊥}.
Transitions probabilities are represented in a quite natural
way. When the game is in state1 and both players play
a, then player1 receives signalα or ⊥ with probability 1
2
,
player2 receives signal⊥ and the game stays in state1.
In state2 when both actions area’s, player1 cannot receive
signalα but instead she may receive signalβ. When ‘guess-
ing the state’ i.e. playing actiongi in statej ∈ {1, 2}, player
1 wins the game ifi = j (she guesses the correct state) and
loses the game if 6= j. The star symbol∗ stands for any
action. In this game, player1 has a strategy to reacht al-
most surely. Her strategy is to keep playing actiona as long
as she keeps receiving signal⊥. The day player1 receives
signalα or β, she plays respectively actiong1 or g2. This
strategy is almost-surely winning because the probability
for player1 to receive signal⊥ forever is0.
2 Qualitative Determinacy.
If an initial distribution is positively winning for player1
then by definition it isnotalmost-surely winning for his op-
ponent player2. A natural question is whether the converse
implication holds.
Definition 3 (Qualitative determinacy). A winning con-
dition Win is qualitatively determinedif for every game
equipped withWin, every initial distribution is either
almost-surely winning for player1 or positively winning for
player2.
Comparison with value determinacy. Qualitative deter-
minacyis similar to but different from the usual notion of
(value) determinacywhich refers to the existence of av lue.
Actually both qualitative determinacy and value determi-
nacy are formally expressed by a quantifier inversion. On
one hand, qualitative determinacy rewrites as:
(∀σ ∃τ Pσ,τδ (Win) < 1) =⇒ (∃τ ∀σ P
σ,τ
δ (Win) < 1) .
On the other hand, the game has a value if:
sup
σ
inf
τ
P
σ,τ
δ (Win) ≥ infτ
sup
σ
P
σ,τ
δ (Win) .
Both the converse implication of the first equation and the
converse inequality of the second equation are obvious.
While value determinacyis a classical notion in game
theory [14], to our knowledge the notion ofqualitative de-
terminacyappeared only in the context of omega-regular
concurrent games [9, 8] and stochastic games with perfect
information [13].
Existence of an almost-surely winning strategy ensures
that the value of the game is1, but the converse is not true.
Actually it can even hold that player2 has a positively win-
ning strategy while at the same time the value of the game
is 1. For example, consider the game depicted on Fig. 2,
which is a slight modification of Fig. 1 (only signals of
player1 and transitions probabilities differ). Player1 has
signals{α, β} and similarly to the game on Fig 1, her goal
is to reach the target stateby guessing correctly whether
the initial state is1 or 2. On one hand, player1 can guar-
antee a winning probability as close to1 as she wants: she
playsa for a long time and compares how often she received
signalsα andβ. If signalsα were more frequent, then she
plays actiong1, otherwise she plays actiong2. Of course,
the longer player1 playsa’s the more accurate the predic-
tion will be. On the other hand, the only strategy available to
player2 (always playingc) is positively winning, because
any sequence of signals in{α, β}∗ can be generated with
positive probability from both states1 and2.
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Figure 2. A reachability game with value 1
where player 2 has a positively winning strat-
egy.
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Qualitative determinacy results. The first main result of
this paper is the qualitative determinacy of stochastic games
with signals for the following winning objectives.
Theorem 1. Reachability, safety and B̈uchi games are qual-
itatively determined.
While qualitative determinacy of safety games is not too
hard to establish, proving determinacy of Büchi games is
harder. Notice that the qualitative determinacy of Büchi
games implies the qualitative determinacy of reachability
games, since any reachability game can be turned into an
equivalent Büchi one by making all target states absorbing.
The proof of Theorem 1 is postponed to Section 4, where
the determinacy result will be completed by a decidability
result: there are algorithms for computing which initial dis-
tributions are almost-surely winning for player1 or posi-
tively winning for player2. This is stated precisely in The-
orems 3 and 4.
A consequence of Theorem 1 is that in a reachability
game, every initial distribution is either almost-surely win-
ning for player1, surelywinning for player2, or positively
winning for both players. Surely winning means that player
2 has a strategyτ for preventing every finite play consistent
with τ from visiting target states.
Büchi games do not share this nice feature because co-
Büchi games are not qualitatively determined. An example
of a co-Büchi game which is not determined is represented
in Fig. 3. In this game, player1 observes everything, player
2 is blind (she only observes her own actions), and player
1’s objective is to avoid statet from some moment on. The
initial state ist.
1 t 2
∗d
bc
∗d
ac ∗c∗∗
Figure 3. Co-Büchi games are not qualita-
tively determined.
On one hand, player1 does not have an almost-surely
winning strategy for the co-Büchi objective. Fix a strategy
σ for player1 and suppose it is almost-surely winning. To
win against the strategy where player2 playsc forever,σ
should eventually play ab with probability 1. Otherwise,
the probability that the play stays in statet is positive, and
σ is not almost-surely winning, a contradiction. Sinceσ is
fixed there exists a date after which player1 has playedb
with probability arbitrarily close to1. Consider the strategy
of player2 which playsd at that date. Although player2 is
blind, obviously she can play such a strategy which requires
only counting time elapsed since the beginning of the play.
With probability arbitrarily close to1, the game is in state
2 and playing ad puts the game back in state. Playing
long sequences ofc’s followed by ad, player2 can ensure
with probability arbitrarily close to1 that if player1 plays
according toσ, the play will visit statest and2 infinitely
often, hence will be lost by player1. This contradicts the
existence of an almost-surely winning strategy for player1.
On the other hand, player2 does not have a positively
winning strategy either. Fix a strategyτ for player2 and
suppose it is positively winning. Onceτ is fixed, player
1 knows how long she should wait so that if actiond was
never played by player2 then there is arbitrarily small prob-
ability that player2 will play d in the future. Player1 plays
a for that duration. If player2 plays ad then the play
reaches state1 and player1 wins, otherwise the play stays
in statet. In the latter case, player1 plays actionb. Player
1 knows that with very high probability player2 will play
c forever in the future, in that case the play stays in state2
and player1 wins. If player1 is very unlucky then player2
will play d again, but this occurs with small probability and
then player1 can repeat the same process again and again.
Similar examples can be used to prove that stochastic Büchi
games with signals do not have a value [18].
3 Memory needed by strategies.
3.1 Finite-memory strategies.
Since our ultimate goal are algorithmic results and con-
troller synthesis, we are especially interested in strategies
that can be finitely described, like finite-memory strategies.
Definition 4 (Finite-memory strategy). A finite-memory
strategyfor player 1 is given by a finite setM called the
memory together with a strategic functionσM : M →
D(I), an update functionupdM : M × C → D(M), and
an initialization functioninitM : P(K) → D(M). The
memory sizeis the cardinal ofM .
In order to play with a finite-memory strategy, a player
proceeds as follows. She initializes the memory ofσ to
initM (L), whereL = supp(δ) is the support of the initial
distributionδ. When the memory is in statem ∈ M , she
plays actioni with probabilityσM (m)(i) and after receiv-
ing signalc, the new memory state ism′ with probability
updM (m, c)(m
′).
On one hand it is intuitively clear how to play with a
finite-memory strategy, on the other hand the behavioral
strategy associated with a finite-memory strategy1 can be
1precisely defined in the Appendix.
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quite complicated and requires the player to use infinitely
many different probability distributions to make random
choices (see discussions in [9, 8, 13]).
In the games we consider, the construction of finite-
memory strategies is often based on the notion ofbelief.
The belief of a player at some moment of the play is the set
of states she thinks the game could possibly be in, according
to the signals she received so far.
Definition 5 (Belief). From an initial set of statesL ⊆ K,
the belief of player1 after receiving signalc (hence playing
actioni(c)), is the set of statesk such that there exists a state
l in L and a signald ∈ D with p(k, c, d | l, i(c), j(d)) > 0.
The belief of player1 after receiving a sequence of signals
c1, . . . , cn is defined inductively by:
B1(L, c1, . . . , cn) = B1(B1(L, c1, . . . , cn−1), cn).
Beliefs of player2 are defined similarly.
Our second main result is that for the qualitatively de-
termined games of Theorem 1, finite-memory strategies are
sufficient for both players. The amount of memory needed
by these finite-memory strategies is summarized in Table 1
and detailed in Theorem 2.
Almost-surely Positively
Reachability belief memoryless
Safety belief doubly-exp
Büchi belief
Co-Büchi doubly-exp
Table 1. Memory required by strategies.
Theorem 2(Finite-memory is sufficient). Every reachabil-
ity game is either won positively by player1 or won surely
by player2. In the first case playing randomly any action
is a positively winning strategy for player1 and in the sec-
ond case player2 has a surely winning strategy with finite-
memoryP(K) and update functionB2.
Every B̈uchi game is either won almost-surely by player
1 or won positively by player2. In the first case player1 has
an almost-surely winning strategy with finite-memoryP(K)
and update functionB1. In the second case player2 has a
positively winning strategy with finite-memoryP(P(K) ×
K).
The situation where a player needs the least memory is
when she wants to win positively a reachability game. To
do so, she uses a memoryless strategy consisting in playing
randomly any action.
To win almost-surely games with reachability, safety and
Büchi objectives, it is sufficient for a player to remember h
belief. A canonical almost-surely winning strategy consists
in playing randomly any action which ensures the next be-
lief to be almost-surely winning2. Similar strategies were
used in [5]. These two results are not very surprising: al-
though they were not stated before as such, they can be
proved using techniques similar to those used in [16, 5].
The element of surprise is the amount of memory needed
for winning positively co-Büchi and safety games. In these
situations, it is still enough for player1 to use a strategy with
finite-memory but, surprisingly perhaps, an exponential size
memory is not enough. Instead doubly-exponentialmemory
is necessary as will be proved in the next subsection.
Doubly-exponential size memory is also sufficient. Ac-
tually for winning positively, it is enough for player1 to
make hypothesis about beliefs of player2, and to store in
her memory all pairs(k, L) of possible current state and be-
lief of her opponent. The update operator of the correspond-
ing finite-memory strategy uses numerous random choices
so that the opponent is unable to predict future moves. More
details are available in the proof of Theorem 4.
3.2 Doubly-exponential memory is neces-
sary to win positively safety games.
We now show that a doubly-exponential memory is nec-
essary to win positively safety (and hence co-Büchi) games.
We construct, for each integern, a reachability game, whose
number of state is polynomial inand such that player2 has
a positively winning strategy for her safety objective. This
game, calledguess my setn, is described on Fig. 4. The
objective of player 2 is to stay away fromt, while player 1
tries to reacht.
We prove that whenever player2 uses a finite-memory
strategy in the gameguess my setn then the size of the
memory has to be doubly-exponential inn, otherwise the
safety objective of player2 may not be achieved with pos-
itive probability. This is stated precisely later in Propo-
sition 1. Prior to that, we briefly describe the game
guess my setn for fixedn ∈ N.
Idea of the game. The gameguess my setn is divided
into three parts. In the first part, player 1 generates a set
X ( {1, . . . , n} of size|X | = n/2. There are
(
n
n/2
)
possi-
bilities of such setsX . Player 2 is blind in this part and has
no action to play.
In the second part, player 1 announces by her actions
1
2
(
n
n/2
)
(pairwise different) sets of sizen/2 which are dif-
ferent fromX . Player 2 has no action to play in that part,
but she observes the actions of player 1 (and hence the sets
announced by player1).
In the third part, player2 can announce by her action
up to 1
2
(
n
n/2
)
sets of sizen/2. Player1 observes actions of
2for reachability and safety games, we suppose without loss of gener-
ality that target states are absorbing.
6
s
∗
t ∗
Player1 chooses secretly a set
X ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of size n
2
Player1 announces publicly
1
2
(
n
n/2
)
sets different fromX
Player2 has1
2
(
n
n/2
)
tries
for findingX
cheat
cheat
cheat
X not found
X found
Figure 4. A game where player 2 needs a lot
of memory to stay away from target state t.
player2. If player2 succeeds in finding the setX , the game
restarts from scratch. Otherwise, the game goes to statet
and player 1 wins.
It is worth noticing that in order to implement the game
guess my setn in a compact way, we allow player 1 to
cheat, and rely on probabilities to always have a chance to
catch player 1 cheating, in which case the game is sent to
the sink states, and player1 loses. That is, player1 has
to play following the rules without cheating else she cannot
win almost-surely her reachability objective. Notice also
that player1 is better informed than player2 in this game.
Concise encoding. We now turn to a more formal descrip-
tion of the gameguess my setn, to prove that it can be en-
coded with a number of states polynomial inn. There are
three problems to be solved, that we sketch here. First, re-
membering setX in the state of the game would ask for an
exponential number of states. Instead, we use a fairly stan-
dard technique: recall at random a single elementx ∈ X .
In order to check that a setY of sizen/2 is different from
the setX of sizen/2, we challenge player 1 to point out
some elementy ∈ Y \ X . We ensure by construction that
y ∈ Y , for instance by asking it whenY is given. This way,
if player 1 cheats, then she will givey ∈ X , leaving a pos-
itive probability thaty = x, in which case the game is sure
that player 1 is cheating and punishes player 1 by sending
her to states where she loses.
The second problem is to make sure that player 1 gen-
erates an exponential number of pairwise different sets
X1, X2, . . . , X 1
2 (
n
n/2)
. Notice that the game cannot re-
call even one set. Instead, player 1 generates the sets in
some total order, denoted<, and thus it suffices to check
only one inequality each time a setXi+1 is given, namely
Xi < Xi+1. It is done in a similar but more involved way
as before, by remembering randomly two elements ofXi
instead of one.
The last problem is to count up to1
2
·
(
n
n/2
)
with a loga-
rithmic number of bits. Again, we ask player 1 to increment
a counter, while remembering only one of the bits and pun-
ishing her if she increments the counter wrongly.
Proposition 1. Player 2 has a finite-memory strategy with
3 × 2
1
2
·( nn/2) different memory states to win positively
guess my setn.
No finite-memory strategy of player 2 with less than
2
1
2
·( nn/2) memory states wins positivelyguess my setn.
Proof. The first claim is quite straightforward. Player2 e-
members in which part she is (3 different possibilities). In
part 2, player2 remembers all the sets proposed by player
1 (2
1
2
·( nn/2) possibilities). Between part 2 and part 3, player
2 inverses her memory to remember the sets player1 did
not propose (still2
1
2
·( nn/2) possibilities). Then she proposes
each of these sets, one by one, in part 3, deleting the set
from her memory after she proposed it. Let us assume first
that player1 does not cheat and plays fair. Then all the sets
of sizen/2 are proposed (since there are2 · 1
2
·
(
n
n/2
)
such
sets), that isX has been found and the game starts another
round without entering statet. Else, if player1 cheats at
some point, then the probability to reach the sink states is
non zero, and player2 also winspositivelyher safety objec-
tive.
The second claim is not hard to show either. The strategy
of player1 is to never cheat, which prevents the game from
entering the sink state. In part 2, player 1 proposes the sets
X in a lexicographical way and uniformly at random. As-
sume by contradiction that player 2 has a counter strategy
with strictly less than2
1
2
·( nn/2) states of memory that wins
positively the safety objective. Consider the end of part 2,
when player 1 has proposed1
2
·
(
n
n/2
)
sets. If there are less
than2
1
2
·( nn/2) states the memory of player2 can be in, then
there exists a memory statem∗ of player 2 and at least two
setsA, B among the1
2
·
(
n
n/2
)
sets proposed by player 1
such that the memory of player 2 afterA is m∗ with non
zero probability and the memory of player 2 afterB is m∗
with non zero probability. Now,A ∪ B has strictly more
than 1
2
·
(
n
n/2
)
sets ofn/2 elements. Hence, there is a set
X ∈ A ∪ B with a positive probability not to be proposed
by player 2 after memory statem∗. Without loss of gener-
ality, we can assume thatX /∈ A (the other caseX /∈ B is
symmetrical). Now, for each round of the game, there is a
positive probability thatX is the set in the memory of player
1, that player 1 proposed setsA, in which case player 2 has
a (small) probability not to proposeX and then the game
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goes tot, where player1 wins. Player1 will thus eventually
reach the target state with probability1, hence a contradic-
tion. This achieves the proof that no finite-memory strategy
of player 2 with less than2
1
2
·( nn/2) states of memory is pos-
itively winning.
4 Decidability.
We turn now to the algorithms which compute the set
of supports that are almost-surely or positively winning for
various objectives.
Theorem 3 (Deciding positive winning in reachability
games). In a reachability game each initial distribution
δ is either positively winning for player1 or surely win-
ning for player2, and this depends only onsupp(δ) ⊆ K.
The corresponding partition ofP(K) is computable in time
O
(
G · 2K
)
, whereG denotes the size of the description of
the game. The algorithm computes at the same time the
finite-memory strategies described in Theorem 2.
As often in algorithmics of game theory, the computation
is achieved by a fix-point algorithm.
Sketch of proof.The set of supportsL ⊆ P(K) surely-
winning for player2 are characterized as the largest fix-
point of some monotonic operatorΦ : P(P(K)) →
P(P(K)). The operatorΦ associates withL ⊆ P(K) the
set of supportsL ∈ L that do not intersect target states and
such that player2 has an action which ensures that her next
belief is inL as well, whatever action is chosen by player1
and whatever signal player2 receives. ForL ⊆ P(K), the
value ofΦ(L) is computable in time linear inL and in the
description of the game, yielding the exponential complex-
ity bound.
To decide whether player1 wins almost-surely a Büchi
game, we provide an algorithm which runs in doubly-
exponential time and uses the algorithm of Theorem 3 as
a sub-procedure.
Theorem 4 (Deciding almost-sure winning in Büchi
games). In a Büchi game each initial distributionδ is ei-
ther almost-surely winning for player1 or positively win-
ning for player2, and this depends only onsupp(δ) ⊆ K.
The corresponding partition ofP(K) is computable in time
O(22
G
), whereG denotes the size of the description of the
game. The algorithm computes at the same time the finite-
memory strategies described in Theorem 2.
Sketch of proof.The proof of Theorem 4 is based on the
following ideas.
First, suppose that fromevery initial support player1
can win thereachability objectivewith positive probability.
Then, repeating the same strategy, Player 1 can guarantee
the Büchi condition to hold with probability1. According
to Theorem 3, in the remaining case there exists a support
L surely winning for player2 for her co-Büchi objective.
We prove that in case player2 can force the belief of
player 1 to beL someday with positive probability from
another supportL′, thenL′ is positively winning as well for
player2. This is not completely obvious because in gen-
eral player2 cannot know exactlywhenthe belief of player
1 is L. For winning positively fromL′, player2 plays to-
tally randomly until she guesses randomly that the belief
of player1 is L, at that moment she switches to a strategy
surely winning fromL. Such a strategy is far from being
optimal, because player2 plays randomly and in most cases
she makes a wrong guess about the belief of player1. How-
ever player2 wins positively because there is a chance she
is lucky and guesses correctly at the right moment the belief
of player1.
Player1 should surely avoid her belief to beL or L′ if
she wants to win almost-surely. However, doing so player
1 may prevent the play from reaching target states, which
may create another positively winning support for player2,
and so on...
Using these ideas, we prove that the setL∞ ⊆ P(K) of
supports almost-surely winning for player1 for the Büchi
objective is the largest set of initial supports from where
(†) player1 has a strategy for winning positively the reach-
ability game while ensuring at the same time her belief
to stay inL∞.
Property (†) can be reformulated as a reachability con-
dition in a new game whose states are states of the original
game augmented with beliefs of player1, kept hidden to
player2.
The fix-point characterization suggests the following al-
gorithm for computing the set of supports positively win-
ning for player2: P(K)\L∞ is the limit of the sequence
∅ = L′0 ( L
′
0 ∪ L
′′
1 ( L
′
0 ∪ L
′
1 ( L
′
0 ∪ L
′
1 ∪ L
′′
2 ( . . . (
L′0 ∪ · · · ∪ L
′
m = P(K)\L∞, where
(a) from supports inL′′i+1 player2 can surely guarantee
the safety objective, under the hypothesis that player1
beliefs stay outsideL′i,
(b) from supports inL′i+1 player2 can ensure with pos-
itive probability the belief of player1 to be inL′′i+1
someday, under the same hypothesis.
The overall strategy of player2 positively winning for
the co-Büchi objective consists in playing randomly for
some time until she decides to pick up randomly a beliefL
of player1 in someL′′i . She forgets the signals she has re-
ceived up to that moment and switches definitively to a strat-
egy which guarantees (a). With positive probability, player
2 is lucky enough to guess correctly the belief of player1 at
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the right moment, and future beliefs of player1 will stay in
L′i, in which case the co-Büchi condition holds.
Property† can be formulated by mean of a fix-point ac-
cording to Theorem 3, hence the set of supports positively
winning for player2 can be expressed using two embedded
fix-points. This should be useful for actually implementing
the algorithm and for computing symbolic representations
of winning sets.
5 Complexity and special cases.
In this section we show that our algorithms are optimal
regarding complexity. Furthermore, we show that these al-
gorithms enjoy better complexity in restricted cases, gen-
eralizing some known algorithms [16, 5] to more general
subcases, while keeping the same complexity.
The special cases that we consider regard inclusion be-
tween knowledges of players. To this end, we define the
following notion. If at each moment of the game the belief
of playerx is included in the one of playery, then playerx
is said to have more information (or to be better informed)
than playery. It is in particular the case when for every tran-
sition, the signal of player1 contains the signal of player2.
5.1 Lower bound.
We prove here that the problem of knowing whether the
initial support of a reachability game is almost-surely win-
ning for player1 is2EXPTIME-complete. The lower bound
even holds when player1 is more informed than player2.
Theorem 5. In a reachability game, deciding whether
player 1 has an almost-surely winning strategy is
2EXPTIME-hard, even if player1 is more informed than
player2.
Sketch of proof.To prove the2EXPTIME-hardness we do
a reduction from the membership problem for alternating
EXPSPACE Turing machines. LetM be such a Turing
machine andw be an input word of lengthn. Player1 is re-
sponsible for choosing the successor configuration in exis-
tential states while player2 owns universal states. The role
of player2 is to simulate an execution ofM onw according
to the rules she and player1 choose. For each configura-
tion she thus enumerates the tape contents. Player1 aims at
reaching target states, which are configurations where the
state is the final state of the Turing machine. Hence, if
player2 does not cheat in her task, player1 has a surely
winning strategy to reach her target if and only ifw is ac-
cepted byM. However player2 could cheat while describ-
ing the tape contents, that is she could give a configuration
not consistent with the previous configuration and the cho-
sen rule. To be able to detect the cheating and punish player
2, one has to remember a position of the tape. Unfortu-
nately, the polynomial-size game cannot remember this po-
sition directly, as there are exponentially many possibilit es.
Instead, we use player1 to detect the cheating of player2.
She will randomly choose a position and the corresponding
letter to remember, and check at the next step that player
2 did not cheat on this position. To prevent player1 from
cheating, that is saying player2 cheats although she did not,
some information is remembered in the states of the game
(but hidden to both players). Here again, the game cannot
remember the precise position of the letter chosen by player
1, since it could be exponential in, so she randomly re-
members a bit of the binary encoding of the letter’s posi-
tion. This way, both players can be caught if they cheat. If
the play reaches a final configuration ofM, player1 wins.
If player2 cheats and player1 delates her, the play is won by
player1. Player1 has a reset action in case she witnesses
player2 has cheated, but she was not caught. If player1
cheats and is caught by the game, the play is won by player
2. This construction ensures that player1 has an almost
sure winning strategy if and only ifw is accepted by the al-
ternating Turing machineM. Indeed, on the one hand, if
w is accepted, player2 needs to cheat infinitely often (af-
ter each reset), so that the final state ofM is not reached.
Player1 has no interest in cheating, and at each step, she
has a positive probability (uniformely bounded by below)
to catch player2 cheating, and thus to win the play. Hence,
player1 wins almost-surely. On the other hand, ifw is not
accepted byM, player2 shouldn’t cheat. The only way for
player1 to win, is to cheat, by denonciating player2 even if
she didn’t cheat. Here, there is a positive probability thate
game remembered the correct bit, that testifies that player1
cheated, and this causes the loss of player1. Hence, player
1 does not have an almost-sure strategy.
5.2 Special cases.
A first straightforward result is that in a safety game
where player1 has full information, deciding whether she
has an almost-surely winning strategy is inPTIME.
Now, consider a Büchi game. In general, as shown in
the previous section, deciding whether the game is almost-
surely winning for player1 is 2EXPTIME-complete. How-
ever, it is already known that when player 2 has a full ob-
servation of the game the problem isEXPTIME-complete
only [5]. We show that our algorithm keeps the sameEX-
PTIME upper-bound even in the more general case where
player2 is more informed than player1, as well as in the
case where player1 fully observes the state of the game.
Proposition 2. In a Büchi game where either player2
has more information than player1 or player 1 has com-
plete observation, deciding whether player1 has an almost-
surely winning strategy or not (in which case player 2 has
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a positively winning strategy) can be done in exponential
time.
Sketch of proof.In both cases, player2 needs only expo-
nential memory because if player2 has more information,
there is always auniquebelief of player1 compatible with
her signals, and in case player1 has complete observation
her belief is always a singleton set.
Note that the latter proposition does not hold when
player1 has more information than player2. Indeed in the
game from the proof of Theorem 5, player1 does have more
information than player2 (but she does not have full infor-
mation).
6 Conclusion.
We considered stochastic games with signals and estab-
lished two determinacy results. First, a reachability game
is either almost-surely winning for player1, surely winning
for player2 or positively winning for both players. Second,
a Büchi game is either almost-surely winning for player1
or positively winning for player2. We gave algorithms for
deciding in doubly-exponential time which case holds and
for computing winning strategies with finite memory.
The question ‘does player1 have a strategy for winning
positively a Büchi game?’ is undecidable [2], even when
player1 is blind and alone. An interesting research direc-
tion is to design subclasses of stochastic games with signal
for which the problem is decidable, for example it should
hold for deterministic games of [5] with complete observa-
tion on one side [21].
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Technical Appendix
A Details for Section 3
We give here all the details for encoding the gamegu ss my setn with a game of polynomial size.
First, we describe how to ensure that a player does exponentially many steps. We show this for a game
with one and a half player, that is one of the player has no moveavailable. This game can thus be
applied to any player.
A.1 Exponential number of steps
Let y1 · · · yn be the binary encoding of a numbery exponential inn (yn being the parity ofx). Here
is a reachability game that the player needs to play forny steps to surely win. Intuitively, the player
needs to enumerate one by one the successors of 0 until reaching y1 · · · yn in order to win. Let say
x′1 · · ·x
′
n is the binary encoding of the successor counterx
′ of counterx. In order to check that the
player does not cheat, the bitx′i for a randomi is secretly remembered. It can be easily computed on
the fly readingxi . . . xn. Indeed,x′i = xi iff there exists somek > i with xk = 0.
Action a and signal coincide, anda ∈ {0, 1, 2}, a ∈ {0, 1} standing for the current bitxi, anda = 2
standing for the fact that the player claims having reachedx.
The state space is basically the following:(i, b, j, b′, j′, c)i,j,j′≤n,x,x′∈{0,1}. The signification of
such a state is that the player will give bitxi, b, j are the check to make to the current number (checking
thatxj = b), b′, j′ are the check to make to the successor ofx (x′j′ = b
′) , andc indicates whether there
is a carry (correctingb′ in casec = 1 at the end of the current number (i = n)). The initial distribution
is the uniform distribution on(0, 0, k, 0, 1) (checking that the initial number generated is indeed0). If
the player plays2, then ifyj = b the game goes to the goal state, else it goes to a sink states.
We haveP ((i, b, j, b′, j′, c), a, s) = 1 if i = j anda 6= b. Else, ifi 6= n, P ((i, b, j, b′, j′, c), a, (i +
1, b, j, b′, j′, c ∧ a)) = 1
2
(the current bit will not be checked, and the carry is 1 if bothc and
a are 1), andP ((i, b, j, b′, j′, c), a, (i + 1, b, j, a, i, 1)) = 1/2. At last, for i = n, we have
P ((i, b, j, b′, j′, c), a, (1, b′ ∧ c, j′, a, 1, 1)) = 1 (the bit of the next number becomes the bit for the
current configuration, taking care of the carryc). Clearly, if the player does not playyn steps of the
game, then it means she did not compute accurately the successor at one step, hence it has a chance to
get caught and lose. That is, the probability to reach the goal state is not 1.
A.2 Implementing guess my setn with a polynomial size game.
We now turn to the formal definition ofguess my setn, with a number of states polynomial inn. At
each time (but in states), player 1 can restart the game from the begining (but from the sink state), we
will say that it performs another round of the game.
The first part of the game is fairly standard, it consists in asking player 1 (who wants to reach some
goal) for a setX of n/2 numbers belown. The states of the game are of the form(x, i), wherex is
the number remembered by the system (hidden for both players), andi ≤ n − 2 is the size ofX so
far. Player 1 actions and signals are the same, equal to{0, . . . , n}, There is no action nor signal for
player 2. We haveP ((x, i), x, s) = 1 (player 1 is caught cheating by proposing again the same number
remembered by the system). For ally 6= x, we haveP ((x, i), y, (x, i + 1)) = 1/2 (the numbery
is accepted as new and the memoryx is not updated),P ((x, i), y, (y, i + 1) = 1/2 (the numbery is
accepted as new and the memory is updatedx := y). If player1 plays0, it means that she has given
n/2 number, the system checks that the current state is indeed(x, n/2) and goes to the next part. If the
current state is not(x, n/2), then it goes tos and player 1 looses.
i
The numberx in the memory of the system at the end of part 1 will be used and remembered all
along this round of the game in the other parts. We turn now to the second part, where player 1 gives
1
2
·
(
n
n/2
)
setsY different toX . First, in order to be sure that every setY she proposes is neverX , player
1 is asked to give one number inY \ {x} (this number is not observed by player 2). Givingx sends the
game into the sink states from which player 1 loses. Since player 1 does not know whatx is, playing
any number inX is dangerous and ensures that the probability of the play reaching the sink states is
stricly positive, hence it cannot reach its goal almost surely. The way the sets are announced by player 1
is the following. First, player 1 is asked whether number 1 belongs to the set it is annoucing (she plays
a if yes,a′ if not, anda′′ if it is and furthermore it is the biggest number which will change compared
to the following set). Player 2 has no choice of action to play. The observation of player 1 and 2 is the
same as the action of player 1, that is player 2 is informed of the sets announced by player 1.
Second, the game needs to ensure that each set is different. For that, it asks player 1 to generate the
sets in lexicographic order (ifY is given beforeY ′, then there existsi, j ∈ Y × Y ′ such thati < j and
for all k ∈ X with k > i, k ∈ X ′ andk 6= j), and to announce in its action what is the biggest numberi
of current setY which will be changed next time. The game remembersi, plus one numberj ∈ Y with
j > i (if any) (it can be done with polynomial number of states). The game checks whether the next set
Y ′ containsj, plus a numberi′ ∈ Y ′ with i < i′ andi′ 6= j. Again, since player 1 does not know the
numberj chosen, if player 1 cheats and changes a numberk > i of Y , then there is always a chance
that the game remembers that number and catches player 1 cheating, in which case the game goes to the
sink states. To be sure that player 1 gives1
2
·
(
n
n/2
)
sets, she plays the game of section A.1 step by step,
advancing to the successor of the current counter only when asetY is proposed. Furthermore, when
she has finished giving1
2
·
(
n
n/2
)
, she goes to the third part.
The third part ressembles the second part: player 2 proposes1
2
·
(
n
n/2
)
sets instead of player 1, and
player 1 observes these sets. For each setY proposed by player2, player1 has to give an event inX \Y
(this is not observed by player 2). This is ensured in the sameway as in part 2. Recall that Player 1 has
always a reset action to restart the game from step 1, but in the sink states. That is, ifY = X , player 1
can ends the round, and restart the game with a new setX in the following round.
After each set proposed by player 2, the game of section A.1 advances to its next step. Once there
has been1
2
·
(
n
n/2
)
setsY proposed with the proof by Player 1 thatX 6= Y , then Player 1 goes to the
goal statet and wins.
B Details for Section 4
B.1 Strategies with finite memory
Definition 6 (Behavioral strategy associated with a finite memory strategy). A strategy with finite mem-
ory is described by a finite setM called the memory, a strategic functionσM : M → D(I), an update
functionupdM : M × C → M , an initialization functioninitM : P(K) → M . The associated
behavioral strategy is defined by
σ(δ)(c1 · · · cn)(i) =
∑
m0···mn∈Mn+1
initM (supp(δ))(m0) · updM (m0, c1)(m1) · · · updM (mn−1, cn)(mn) · σM (mn)(i)
B.2 Beliefs and the shifting lemma
When ”shifting time” in proofs, we will use the followingshifting lemma, either explicitely or im-
plicitely.
ii
Lemma 1 (Shifting lemma). Letf : Sω → {0, 1} be the indicator function of a measurable event,δ be
an initial distribution andσ andτ two strategies. Then:
P
σ,τ
δ (f(K1, K2, . . .) = 1 | C1 = c, D1 = d) = P
σc,τd
δcd
(f(K0, K1, . . .) = 1) ,
where∀k ∈ K, δcd(k) = P
σ,τ
δ (K1 = k | C1 = c, D1 = d), σc(c2c3 · · · cn) = σ(cc2c3 · · · cn) and
τd(d2d3 · · · dn) = σ(dd2d3 · · ·dn).
Proof. Using basic definitions, this holds whenf is the indicator function of a union of cylinders, and
the class of events that satisfy this property is a monotone class.
We will use heavily the following properties of beliefs.
Proposition 3. Let σ, τ be strategies for player1 and2 andδ an initial distribution with supportL.
Then forn ∈ N,
P
σ,τ
δ (Kn+1 ∈ B1(L, C1, . . . , Cn)) = 1 . (3)
Moreover, letτU be the strategy for player2 which plays every action uniformly at random. Then for
everyn ∈ N andc1 · · · cn ∈ C∗, if P
σ,τU
δ (C1 = c1, . . . , Cn = cn) > 0 then for every statek ∈ K,
(k ∈ B1(L, c1, . . . , cn)) ⇐⇒ (P
σ,τU
δ (Kn+1 = k, C1 = c1, . . . , Cn = cn) > 0) . (4)
Consider the reachability, safety, Büchi or co-B̈uchi condition, and supposeσ andδ are almost-surely
winning for player1. Then for everyn ∈ N and strategyτ ,
P
σ,τ
δ (B1(L, D1, . . . , Dn) is a.s.w. for player1) = 1 . (5)
Proof. Easy from the definitions using the shifting lemma. Recall for reachability and safety games,
we suppose without loss of generality that target states areabsorbing. The first statement says that the
current state is always in the belief of player1. The second statement says that in case player2 plays
every action, then every state in the belief of player1 is a possible current state. The third statement
says in case player1 plays with an almost-surely winning strategy, his belief should stay almost-surely
winning. This is becauseσ should be almost-surely winning againstτU as well.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 (Deciding positive winning in reachability games). In a reachability game each initial
distributionδ is either positively winning for player1 or surely winning for player2, and this depends
only onsupp(δ) ⊆ K. The corresponding partition ofP(K) is computable in timeO
(
G · 2K
)
, where
G denotes the size of the description of the game. The algorithm computes at the same time the finite-
memory strategies described in Theorem 2.
The proof is elementary. By inspection of the proof, one can obtain bounds on time and probabilities
before reaching a target state, using the uniform memoryless strategyσU . From an initial distribution
positively winning for the reachability objective, for every strategyτ ,
P
σU ,τ
δ
(
∃n ≤ 2K , Kn ∈ T
)
≥
(
1
p | I |
)2
K
, (6)
wherep is the smallest non-zero transition probability.
iii
Proof. Let L∞ ⊆ P(K\T ) be the greatest fix-point of the monotonic operatorΦ : P(P(K\T )) →
P(P(K\T )) defined by:
Φ(L) = {L ∈ L | ∃jL ∈ J, ∀d ∈ D, (jL = j(d)) =⇒ B2(L, d) ∈ L} ,
in other wordsΦ(L) is the set of supports such that player2 has an actionj, such that whatever signal
d she might receive (coherent withj of course) her new belief will still be inL. Let σR be the strategy
for player1 that plays randomly any action.
We are going to prove that:
(A) every support inL∞ is surely winning for player2,
(B) andσR is positively winning from any supportL ⊆ K which is not inL∞.
We start with proving (A). For winning surely from any support L ∈ L∞, player2 uses the following
finite-memory strategyτ : if the current belief of player2 is L ∈ L∞ then player2 chooses an action
jL such that whatever signald player2 receives (withj(d) = jL), her next beliefB2(L, d) will be in
L∞ as well. By definition ofΦ there always exists such an actionjL, and this defines a finite memory
strategy with memoryP(K\T ) and update operatorB2.
When playing with strategyτ , starting from a support inL∞, beliefs of player2 never intersectT .
According to 3 of Proposition 3, this guarantees the play never visitsT , whatever strategy is used by
player1.
Conversely, we prove (B). Once the memoryless strategyσR for player1 is fixed, the game is a
one-player game where only player2 has choices to make: it is enough to prove (B) in the special case
where the set of actions of player1 is a singletonI = {i}. Let L0 = P(K\T ) ⊇ L1 = Φ(L0) ⊇
L2 = Φ(L1) . . . andL∞ be the limit of this sequence, the greatest fixpoint ofΦ. We prove that for any
supportL ∈ P(K), if L 6∈ L∞ then:
L is positively winning for player1 . (7)
If L∩T 6= ∅, (7) is obvious. For dealing with the case whereL ∈ P(K\T ), we define for everyn ∈ N,
Kn = P(K\T )\Ln, and we prove by induction on ∈ N that for everyL ∈ Kn, for every initial
distributionδL with supportL, for every strategyτ ,
PτδL (∃m, 2 ≤ m ≤ n + 1, Km ∈ T ) > 0 . (8)
Forn = 0, (8) is obvious becauseK0 = ∅. Suppose that for somen ∈ N, (8) holds for everyL ∈ Kn,
and letL ∈ Kn+1. If L ∈ Kn then by inductive hypothesis, (8) holds. OtherwiseL ∈ Kn+1\Kn and
by definition ofKn+1,
L ∈ Ln\Φ(Ln) . (9)
Let δL be an initial distribution with supportL andτ a strategy for player2. Let j be an action such that
τ(δL)(j) > 0. According to (9), by definition ofΦ, there exists a signald ∈ D such thatj = j(d) and
B2(L, d) 6∈ Ln. If B2(L, d) ∩ T 6= ∅ then according to Proposition 3,PτδL (K2 ∈ T ) > 0. Otherwise
B2(L, d) ∈ P(K\T )\Ln = Kn hence distributionδd(k) = PτδL (K2 = k | D1 = d) has its support in
Kn. By inductive hypothesis,for every strategyτ ′, Pτ
′
δd
(∃m ∈ N, 2 ≤ m ≤ n + 1, Km ∈ T ) > 0 hence
according to the shifting lemma and the definition ofδd, Pτδ (∃m ∈ N, 3 ≤ m ≤ n + 2, Km ∈ T ) > 0,
which achieves the inductive step.
For computing the partition of supports between those positively winning for player1 and those
surely winning for player2, it is enough to compute the largest fixpoint ofΦ. SinceΦ is monotonic,
and each application of the operator can be computed in time linear in the size of the game (G) and the
number of supports (2K) the overall computation can be achieved in timeG2K . For computing strategy
τ , it is enough to compute for eachL ∈ L∞ an actionjL which ensuresB2(L, d) ∈ L∞.
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B.4 Proof of Theorem 4
Theorem 4(Deciding almost-sure winning in Büchi games). In a Büchi game each initial distributionδ
is either almost-surely winning for player1 or positively winning for player2, and this depends only on
supp(δ) ⊆ K. The corresponding partition ofP(K) is computable in timeO(22
G
), whereG denotes
the size of the description of the game. The algorithm computes at the same time the finite-memory
strategies described in Theorem 2.
We start with formalizing what it means for player1 to force her pessimistic beliefs to stay in a
certain set.
Definition 7. Let L ⊆ P(K) be a set of supports. We say that player1 can enforce her beliefs to
stay outsideL if player 1 has a strategyσ such that for every strategyτ of player2 and every initial
distributionδ whose support is not inL,
P
σ,τ
δ (∀n ∈ N,B1(L, C1, . . . , Cn) 6∈ L) = 1 . (10)
Equivalently, for everyL 6∈ L, the set:
I(L) = {i ∈ I such that∀c ∈ C, if i = i(c) thenB1(L, c) 6∈ L} ,
is not empty.
Proof. The equivalence is straightforward. In one direction, letσ be a strategy with the property above,
L 6∈ L, δL a distribution with supportL andi an action such thatσ(δL)(i) > 0. Then according to (10),
i ∈ IL henceIL is not empty. In the other direction, ifIL is not empty for everyL 6∈ L then consider
the finite-memory strategyσ which consists in playing any action inIL when the belief isL. Then by
definition of beliefs (10) holds.
We need the notion ofL-games.
Definition 8 (L-games). LetL be a set of supports such that player1 can enforce her beliefs to stay
outsideL. For every supportL 6∈ L, let I(L) be the set of actions given by Definition 7. TheL-game
has same actions, transitions and signals than the originalpartial observation game, only the winning
condition changes: player1 wins if the play reaches a target state and moreover player1 does not use
actions other thanIL whenever her pessimistic belief isL. Formally given an initial distributionδ with
supportL and two strategiesσ andτ the winning probability of player1 is:
P
σ,τ
δ (∃n, Kn ∈ T and∀n, In ∈ I(B1(L, C1, . . . , Cn))) .
Actually, winning positively anL-game amounts to winning positively a reachability game with state
spaceP(K) × K, as shown by the following lemma and its proof.
Proposition 4 (L-games). LetL ⊆ P(K) be a set of supports such thatL is upward-closed and player
1 can enforce her pessimistic beliefs to stay outsideL.
(i) In theL-game, every support is either positively winning for player 1 or surely winning for player
2. We denoteL′′ the set of supports that are not inL and are surely winning for player2 in the
L-game.
(ii) SupposeL′′ is empty i.e. every support not inL is positively for player1 in theL-game. Then
every support not inL is almost-surely winning for player1, both in theL-game and also for the
Büchi objective. Moreover, the strategyσL for player1 which consists in chosing randomly any
action inI(L) when her belief isL is almost-surely winning in theL-game.
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(iii) SupposeL′′ is not empty. Then player2 has a strategyτ for winning surely theL-game from any
support inL′′, andτ has finite memoryP((P(K)\L) × K).
(iv) There is an algorithm running in time doubly-exponential time in the size ofG for computingL′′
and, in case (iii) holds, strategyτ .
The proof is based on Theorem 3.
Proof. We define a reachability game which is a synchronized productof the original gameG with
beliefs of player1, with a few modifications. this new reachability game is denot dGL. The state space
is K × (P(K)\L) ∪ {⊥}, where{⊥} is a sink state, used for punishing player1 whenever he uses an
action not inI(L). Target states ofGL are those whose first component is a target state of the initial
gameG. Actions and signals of both players are the same as inG. The transition function is the product
of the transition function ofG (for the first component), together with the belief operatorB1 (for the
second component), with one modification: whenever the current state is(l, L) and player1 plays an
actioni which is not inI(L), the next state is{⊥}, and remains{⊥} forever.
Applying Theorem 3 to the reachability gameGL, we get (i) and (iii). Property (i) holds because a
strategy for player1 is positively winning in theL-game if and only if it is positively winning inGL
and a strategy for player2 is surely winning in theL-game if and only if it is surely winning inGL.
Property (iii) holds according to Theorem 3, because the stat pace ofGL is K × (P(K)\L) ∪ {⊥}
and player2 can forget about state⊥ because it is a sink state.
Computability ofL′′ andσ andτ stated in (iv) is straightforward from Theorem 3 applied toGL.
Now we supposeL′′ is empty and prove (ii). According to Theorem 3, any support nt i L is
positively winning for player1 in GL and moreover the strategyσR which consists in playing randomly
any action is positively winning for player1. When the belief of player1 is L, playing an actioni
which is not inI(L) leads immediatly to a non-accepting sink state, hence strategyσL which consists
in playing randomly any action inI(L) is positively winning as well, from any initial distribution whose
support is not inL.
To prove (ii) it is enough to show that for every initial distrbutionδ whose support is not inL,
σL is almost-surely winning for player1 from δ . (11)
Note this is a consequence of (6), but we quickly reprove it. For proving (11), we need to give an
upper bound on the time to wait before seeing a target state. We start with proving that for eachL 6∈ L
there existsNL ∈ N such that for every strategyτ , for every distributionδ with supportL,
P
σ,τ
δ (∃n ≤ NL, Kn ∈ T ) ≥
1
NL
. (12)
We suppose such anNL does not exist and seek for a contradiction. Suppose for every N there exists
τN andδN with supportL such that (12) does not hold. Without loss of generality, since σ is fixed
and property (12) only concerns the firstN steps of the game, we can ”de-randomize” strategyτN and
supposeτN is deterministic i.e.τN : D∗ → J . Without loss of generality, we can assume as well
thatδN converges to some distributionδ, whose support is necessarily included inL. Using Koenig’s
lemma, it is easy to build a strategyτ : D∗ → J such that for infinitely manyN ,
P
σ,τ
δN
(∃n ≤ N, Kn ∈ T ) <
1
N
.
Taking the limit whenN → ∞, we get:
P
σ,τ
δ (∃n, Kn ∈ T ) = 0 .
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this contradicts the fact thatσ is positively winning fromL, because the support ofδ is included in
L 6∈ L and by hypothesisL is upward closed hencesupp(δ) 6∈ L as well. This proves the existence of
NL such that (12) holds.
Now we can achieve the proof of (ii). LetN = max{NL | L 6∈ L}. Then for every strategyτ and
every distributionδ whose support is not inL,
P
σ,τ
δ (∃n ≤ N, Kn ∈ T ) ≥
1
N
. (13)
SinceσL guarantees the belief of player1 to stay outsideL, we can apply the shifting lemma and get:
P
σL,τ
δ (∀n ≤ 2N, Kn 6∈ T ) ≤ (1 −
1
N
)2 ,
and by induction,
P
σL,τ
δ (∃n ∈ N, Kn ∈ T ) = 1 .
This holds for every strategyτ and every distributionδ whose support is not inL. SinceσL guarantees
the belief of player1 to stay outsideL, by induction using (4) we obtain
P
σL,τ
δ (∃
∞n, Kn ∈ T ) = 1 .
This achieves to prove thatσL is almost-surely winning from any supportL 6∈ L for the Büchi condition.
This proves (11) hence (ii).
The following proposition provides a fix-point characterizat on of almost-surely winning supports
for player1.
Proposition 5 (Fix-point characterization of almost-surely winning supports). LetL ⊆ P(K) be a set
of supports. Suppose player1 can enforce her beliefs to stay outsideL. Then,
(i) either every supportL 6∈ L is almost-surely winning for player1 and her B̈uchi objective,
(ii) or there exists a set of supportsL′ ⊆ P(K) and a strategyτ∗ for player2 such that:
(a) L′ is not empty and does not intersectL,
(b) player1 can enforce her beliefs to stay outsideL ∪ L′,
(c) for every strategyσ and initial distributionδ with support inL′,
P
σ,τ∗
δ
(
∀n ≥ 2K , Kn 6∈ T | ∀n,B1(L, C1, . . . , Cn) 6∈ L
)
> 0 . (14)
There exists an algorithm running in time doubly-exponential in the size ofG for deciding which of
cases (i) or (ii) holds. In case (i) holds, the strategyσL for player1 which consists in playing randomly
any action inI(L) when her belief isL is almost-surely winning for the B̈uchi objective. In case
(ii) holds, the algorithm computes at the same timeL′ and a finite memory strategyτ∗ with memory
P(L′ × K)\{∅} such that(14)holds.
Proof. LetL′′ be the set of supports surely winning for player2 in theL-game. LetτU be the memory-
less strategy for player2 playing randomly any action. LetL′ be the set of supportsL such thatL 6∈ L
and,
∀σ, Pσ,τUδL
(
∃n ≤ 2K ,B1(L, C1, . . . , Cn) ∈ L
′′ ∪ L
)
> 0 , (15)
whereδL is the uniform distribution onL.
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We start with proving that ifL′′ is empty then case (i) of Proposition 5 holds. Since player1 can
enforce her beliefs to stay outsideL, thenL′ is empty as well. Moreover, according to (ii) of Proposi-
tion 4, every support not inL is almost-surely winning for player1 for the Büchi condition, hence we
are in case (i) of Proposition 5.
Suppose now thatL′′ is not empty, Then we prove (ii)(a), (ii)(b) and (ii)(c) of Proposition 5.
First (ii)(a) is obvious because sinceL′′ ⊆ L′, thenL′ is not empty either
Now we prove property (ii)(b) holds: player1 can enforce his beliefs to stay outsideL ∪ L′. There
existsσ such that (15) does not hold, and we can even supposeσ deterministic, i.e.σ : P(K)×C∗ → I.
This strategyσ guarantees the belief of player1 to stay outsideL′′∪L for the first2K steps os the game.
We can modifyσ such that this holds for all steps of the game. For that, player 1 can use strategyσ′
which plays likeσ, and as soon as player1 has twice the same beliefL, she forgets every signal she
received between the two occurences ofL and keep playing withσ. Using (4) and the shifting lemma,
one proves that if playingσ′ there is positive probability that the belief of player1 is inL”∪L someday
then there is positive probability that the belief of player1 is in L” ∪ L someday and moreover all
beliefs of player1 are different up to that moment. Since there are at most2K different beliefs, this
contradicts the definition ofσ. Henceσ′ guarantees the belief of player1 to stay outsideL′′∪L forever.
As a consequence,σ′ guarantees the belief of player1 to stay outsideL′ as well forever, again this is an
application of (4) and the shifting lemma.
Description of the positively winning strategyτ∗ for player 2. It remains to prove (ii)(c). According
to (iii) of Proposition 4, there exists a strategyτ ′ for player2 which is surely winning in theL-game
from any support inL′′.
We define a strategyτ∗ for player2 which guarantees (14) to hold. At each step, player2 throws a
coin. As long as the result is ”tail”, then player2 plays randomly any action: she keeps playing withτU .
If the result is ”head” then player2 picks randomly a supportL ∈ L′′ (actually she guesses the belief
of player1), forgets all her signals up to now and switches definitivelyto strategyτ ′ with initial support
L.
Intuitively, what matters with strategyτ∗ is that the opponent player1 does not know whether he
faces strategyτ ′ or strategyτU , because everything is possible with strategyτU . Formalizing this very
simple idea is a bit painful.
Let us prove thatτ∗ guarantees property (14) to hold.
We start with proving for every strategyσ of player1 andδ an initial distribution whose support is
in L ∈ L′, there exists a supportL′′ ∈ L′′, N ≤ 2K andc1 · · · cN ∈ C∗ such that:
∀l ∈ L′′, δ′′(l) = Pσ,τ
∗
δ (Kn = l, C1 = c1, . . . , CN = cN ) > 0 . (16)
By definition of L′ and τU , there existsc1, . . . , cN and a supportL′′ ∈ L′′ such thatL′′ =
B1(L, c1, . . . , cN ), N ≤ 2K andP
σ,τU
δ (C1 = c1, . . . , Cn = cN ) > 0. Let, Then, according to (4),
∀l ∈ L′′, Pσ,τUδ (Kn = l, C1 = c1, . . . , CN = cN ) > 0. Since by definition ofτ
∗, there is positive
probability thatτ plays likeτU up to stageN , then we get (16).
Now we can achieve the proof of (14). Sinceτ ′ is surely winning in theL-game fromL′′ ∈ L′′, it
guarantees that:
∀σ, Pσ,τ
′
δ′′ (∀n ∈ N, Kn 6∈ T | ∀n ∈ N, In ∈ I(B1(L
′′, C1, . . . , Cn))) = 1 .
There is positive probability that at stagen, τ∗ switches to strategyτ ′ in initial stateL′′. By definition of
beliefs,B1(L′′, C1, . . . , Cn) = B1(L, c1, . . . , cN , C1, . . . , Cn), hence according to (16) and the shifting
lemma,
∀σ, Pσ,τ
∗
δ (∀n ≥ N, Kn 6∈ T, C1 · · ·CN = c1 · · · cN | ∀n ≥ N, In ∈ I(B1(L, C1, . . . , Cn))) > 0 .
(17)
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According to the definition of I(L), for every σ and n ∈ N,
P
σ,τU
δ (B1(L, C1, . . . , Cn, Cn+1) ∈ L | In 6∈ I(B1(L, C1, . . . , Cn))) > 0 and since there is posi-
tive probability thatτ plays likeτU up to stagen, the same holds forτ , hence:
P
σ,τ∗
δ (∀n ∈ N, In ∈ I(B1(L, C1, . . . , Cn)) | ∀n ∈ N,B1(L, C1, . . . , Cn) 6∈ L) > 0 .
This last equation together with (17) proves (14), which achieves to prove (ii)(c) of Proposition 5.
Description of the algorithm. To achieve the proof of Proposition 5, we have to describe thedoubly-
exponential algorithm. This algorithm is a fix-point algorithm, actually there are two embedded fix-
points, since this algorithm uses twice as sub-procedures the algorithm provided by Theorem 3 on game
GL defined in the proof of Proposition 4.
The algorithm of Proposition 4, property (iv) is used for computingL′′, andσ or τ ′.
In caseL′′ is empty, the algorithm simply outputs strategyσL described in (ii) of Proposition 5. In
caseL′′ is not empty, the algorithm computes the set of supportsL′ defined by (15), from which player
2 can force the belief of player1 to be inL′′ ∪ L someday with positive probability. For computingL′,
we have to fix strategyτU in the gameGL and check whether player1 has a strategy for avoiding surely
his beliefs to be inL′ ∪ L, which can be done running the algorithm of Proposition 5 to the gameGL.
Remark we prove the bound2K can be replaced byN in (15).
OnceL′ has been computed, the algorithm outputs strategyτ∗ described above.
The proof of Theorem 4 illustrates how to compose the variousfinite memory strategies of Proposi-
tion 5 to obtain a strategy for player2 which is positively winning and has finite memoryP(P(K)×K).
Proof of Theorem 4.According to Proposition 5, starting withL0 = ∅, there exists a sequenceL′0,L
′
1,
. . . , L′n of disjoint non-empty sets of supports such that for everym ≤ n,
• if 0 ≤ m < M thenLm = L′0 ∪ · · · ∪ L
′
m−1, matches case (ii) of Proposition 5. We denoteτm
the corresponding finite memory strategy.
• LM matches case (i) of Proposition 5.
Then according to Proposition 5, the set of supports positively winning for player2 is exactlyLM ,
and supports that are not inLM are almost-surely winning for player1. This proves qualitative deter-
minacy.
The sequenceL′0,L
′
1, . . . ,L
′
n is computable in doubly-exponential time, because each applic tion of
Proposition 5 involves running the doubly exponential-time algorithm, and the length of the sequence
is at most doubly-exponential in the size of the game.
The only thing that remains to prove is the existence and computability of a positively winning
strategyτ+ for player2, with finite memoryP(P(K) × K). Strategyτ consists in playing randomly
any action as long as a coin gives result ”head”. When the coingives result ”tail”, then strategyτ+
chooses randomly an integer0 ≤ m < M and a supportL ∈ L′m and switches to strategyτm. Since
each strategyτm has memoryP(L′m × K)\{∅} and theL
′
m are distincts, strategyτ
+ has memory
P(P(K) × K) with ∅ used as the initial memory state.
We prove thatτ+ is positively winning for player2 from LM . Let σ be a strategy for player1,
L ∈ LM andδ an initial distribution with supportL. Let m0 be the smallest indexm such that
P
σ,τ+
δ (∃n ∈ N,B1(L, C1, . . . , Cn) ∈ L
′
m) > 0 .
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SinceL ∈ LM andLM =
⋃
m<M L
′
m, the set in the definition ofm0 is non-empty andm0 is well
defined. Letn0 ∈ N andc1, c2, . . . , cn0 ∈ C
n0 such thatB1(L, c1, . . . , cn0) ∈ L
′
m0 and
P
σ,τ+
δ (C1 = c1, . . . , Cn0 = cn0) > 0 .
According to the definition ofτ+, there is positive probability thatτ+ plays randomly until stepn0
hence according to (4), for every statel ∈ B1(L, c1, . . . , cn0),
P
σ,τ+
δ (C1 = c1, . . . , Cn0 = cn0 andKn = l) > 0 . (18)
According to the definition ofτ+ again, there is positive probability thatτ+ switches to strategyτm0 at
instantn0. SinceB1(L, c1, . . . , cn0) ∈ L
′
n0 hence according to (18) and to (14) of Proposition 5,
P
σ,τ+
δ
(
∀n ≥ 2K , Kn 6∈ T | ∀n ≥ n0,B1(L, C1, . . . , Cn) 6∈ Lm0
)
> 0 . (19)
By definition ofm0 and sinceLm0 = L
′
0 ∪ · · · ∪ L
′
m0−1,
P
σ,τ+
δ (∀n ∈ N,B1(L, C1, . . . , Cn) 6∈ Lm0) = 1 ,
then together with (19),
P
σ,τ+
δ
(
∀n ≥ 2K , Kn 6∈ T
)
> 0 ,
which proves thatτ+ is positively winning for the co-Büchi condition.
C Details for Section 5
Proof of 2EXPTIME-hardness
We give here a more detailed proof for the 2EXPTIME-hardness of the problem of deciding whether
player1 has an almost-surely winning strategy in a reachability game.
Theorem 5. In a reachability game, deciding whether player1 has an almost-surely winning strategy
is 2EXPTIME-hard, even if player1 is more informed than player2.
Proof. We reduce the membership problem for alternatingEXPSPACE Turing machines. LetM be
anEXPSPACE alternating Turing machine, amdw be an input word of lengthn. FromM we build
a stochastic game with partial observation such that player1 can achieve almost-surely a reachability
objective if and only ifw is accepted byM. The idea of the game is that player2 describes an execution
ofM onw, that is, she enumerates the tape contents of successive configurations. Moreover she chooses
the rule to apply when the state ofM is universal, whereas player1 is responsible for choosing the rule
in existential states. When the Turing machine reaches its final state, the play is won by player1. In
this simple deterministic game, if player2 eally implements some execution ofM onw, player1 has a
surely winning strategy if and only ifw is accepted byM. Indeed, if all executions onw reach the final
state ofM, then whatever the choices player2 makes in universal states, player1 can properly choose
rules to apply in existential states in order to reach a final configuration of the Turing machine. On the
other hand, if some execution onw does not lead to the final state ofM, player1 is not sure to reach a
final configuration and win the game.
This reasoning holds under the assumption that player2 effectively describes the execution ofM on
w consistent with the rules chosen by both players. However, player2 could cheat when enumerating
successive configurations of the execution. She would for instance do so, ifw is indeed accepted byM,
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in order to have a chance not to lose the game. To prevent player 2 from cheating (or at least to prevent
her from cheating too often), it would be convenient for the game to remember the tape contents, and
check that in the next configuration, player2 indeed applied the chosen rule. However, the game can
remember only a logarithmic number of bits, while the configurations have a number of bits exponential
in n. Instead, we ask player1 to pick any positionk of the tape, and to announce it to the game (player
2 does not knowk), which is described by a linear number of bits. The game keeps the the letter at
this position together with the previous and next letter on the tape. This allows the game to compute
the lettera at positionk of thenextconfiguration. As player2 describes the next configuration, player
1 will annouce to the game that positionk has been reached again. The game will thus check that the
letter player 2 gives is indeeda. This way, the game has a positive probability to detect thatplayer2 is
cheating. If so, the game goes to a sink state which is winningfor player1. To increase the probability
for player1 of observing player2 cheating, player1 has the possibility to restart the whole execution
from the beginning whenever she wants. In particular, she will do so when an execution lasts longer
than22
n
steps. This way, if player2 cheats infinitely often, player1 will detect it with probability one,
and will win the game almost-surely. So far, we described a deterministic game satisfying that ifw is
accepted byM, player1 has a mixed strategy to reach her winning state almost surely, and without
cheating (that is, denonciating player2 only if she was cheating).
We now have to take into account that player1 could cheat: she could point a certain position of the
tape contents at a given step, and point somewhere else in thenext step. To avoid this kind of behaviour,
or at least refrain it, a piece of information about the positi n pointed by player1 is kept secret (to both
players) in the state of the game. More precisely, a bit of thebinary encoding of the letter position on
the tape, and the position of this bit itself is randomly chosen among the at mostn possible positions.
If player1 is caught cheating (that is, if the bits at the position rememb red differ between both step),
the game goes to a sink state losing for player1. This way, when player1 decides to cheat, there is a
positive probability that she loses the game. At this stage,the game is stochastic (a bit and a position
are remembered randomly in states of the game), player1 does not have full information (she does not
know which bit is remembered in the state), but she has more information than player2 (the latter does
not know what letter player1 decided to memorize). Moreover, the game satisfies the following: w is
accepted byM if and only if player1 has mixed winning strategy which ensures reaching a goal state
almost surely.
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